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This article canvasses some of the main points raised by Schwarzenberger in a famous
article written in the 1950s. The central objection he had to the idea of an international
criminal law arose from the structure of the system of international law itself, which
has no central authority to enforce its proscriptions. This article explores the concept
of individual and state criminal responsibility and considers the characteristics which
all international crimes cumulatively embrace. It considers recent evidence of
international criminal law offered by the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals and
the International Criminal Court. It attempts to chart the progress made by the
international community in this field since the 1950s but concludes, as did
Schwarzenberger, that international criminal law is not universally applicable.
Introduction
In a world of uncertainty, we can be certain that the article, `The problem of
an international criminal law' by Georg Schwarzenberger, 1 will be prescribed
reading for the introductory lecture on what is international criminal law in
any course on that subject. A further certainty is that the world in 2003 is a
very different place to that of 1950 when his article was first published,
particularly because it is no longer divided into two diametrically opposed
camps as it was during the Cold War.
Schwarzenberger's article is a useful teaching tool because he challenged
the meaning and value of `international criminal law'. He began by
dismissing the claim that `international criminal law' had been established
`unequivocally as a technical term'. 2 In support of this dismissal,
Schwarzenberger analysed several different meanings attributed to the term
`by those who consider international criminal law to form part of the existing
law of nations'. 3
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First, there was `international criminal law' as the ability of states to extend
the territorial scope of their municipal criminal law beyond their boundaries.
Secondly, `international criminal law' had been equated with internationally
prescribed municipal criminal law that in some instances, but not all, 4 led
when violated to internationally authorised domestic prosecutions. Finally,
he noted that `international criminal law' had been understood as
international co-operation in the administration of municipal criminal
justice. We are struck by the repetition of the proponents of an
`international criminal law' in locating the meaning of international criminal
law within `municipal criminal law'. Surely we would expect international
criminal law to imply an international criminal justice system? Schwarzen-
berger, therefore, concluded that these meanings were `merely a loose and
misleading label for topics that comprise anything but international criminal
law'.5
Schwarzenberger had two main objections to `international criminal law'.
First, for `international criminal law' to exist in a true or material sense, it
should consist of `rules germane to international law with two essential
characteristics . . . a prohibitive character and . . . endowed with penal
sanctions'. 6 As with criminal law in municipal jurisdictions, he expected that
the conduct prohibited and sanctioned by international criminal law would
`strike at the very roots of international society' 7 and be strengthened by the
threat of having penal sanctions imposed by a superior authority when the
law was infringed.
Secondly, Schwarzenberger's main objection was the absence of a strong
central power in international society. In the 1950s, `any attempt to enforce
an international criminal code against either the Soviet Union or the United
States . . . would be war under another name'. 8 For him, both the `swords of
war and of justice [were] . . . annexed to the Sovereign Power' 9 and it was
only `[i]f, and when, the swords of war [were] taken from their present
guardians . . . [that] the international community [would] be strong enough to
wield the sword of universal criminal justice'. 10
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The question this article addresses is one that is often put to students after
reading Schwarzenberger's famous article. In light of the tremendous
developments made towards international criminal justice since the end of
the Cold War, the question is: Has international criminal law become a more
defensible concept? Does one conclude, as Schwarzenberger did, that `in the
present state of world society, international criminal law in any true sense
d[oes] not exist'? 11 The article seeks to answer these questions against an
analysis of the attempts by the international community `to wield the sword
of universal criminal justice'. 12
Criminal Law in an International Society
A first reading of Schwarzenberger reminds one of the age-old debate as to
whether or not international law even exists because the model of a
vertically-structured state does not fit that of a horizontally-structured
international society. Unlike a municipal legal system with a central
legislature, executive and court system, international society still remains
largely without these institutions. 13
Positivist legal theory premises the source of the existence of law on the
command of a sovereign with the authority to enforce its command by the
threat of sanction.14 Echoing the language of positivism, Schwarzenberger
argued against the material existence of international criminal law because of
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the lack of an international authority that is superior to all states that can
enforce its prohibitions universally. 15
Yet, in principle, he stated that `there is no preconceived reason why
international law should, or should not recognize the existence of international
crimes'.16 States, he argued, have the ability and freedom to bind themselves in
whatever manner, either through acceding to treaties in the multilateral treaty-
making process or through recognising legal obligations binding on
themselves through their practice as international custom. To Schwarzen-
berger it did not matter whether potential violators of the rules of international
criminal law were states or individuals as subjects or objects respectively of
international law. What was important to him was one `very simple criterion:
the evidence produced by those who assert the existence of an international
criminal law'.17
Today, when looking for such evidence one thinks of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). A
number of issues that relate to the essence of international law and criminal
law arise for consideration. First, are individuals properly the subjects of
criminal responsibility for international rules? Secondly, what are these
international crimes that consist of `rules germane to international law with
. . . a prohibitive character . . . with penal sanction'? 18 Thirdly, can international
criminal law impose criminal responsibility directly on individuals given that
there is no strong central power in the international community.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
At a domestic level, the individual has legal personality and is the legal
subject of the municipal state. At the international level, states are the
subjects of international law for they alone19 are capable of possessing
international rights and duties and have the capacity to maintain their rights
by bringing international claims. However, for criminal responsibility all
criminal justice systems of the world, as a general principle of law, recognise
that only those who deserve punishment should suffer it. The criminal justice
396 SACJ . (2003) 16
15 Schwarzenberger op cit (n1) 295.
16 Op cit (n1) 275.
17 Op cit (n1) 276.
18 Op cit (n1) 264.
19 Certain international organisations like the United Nations are also recognised as having legal
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system is therefore shaped by its role of showing beyond doubt that the
accused is the individual responsible. 20
Although various authors argue that the individual is a subject of
international law,21 the better view is that `[i]ndividuals benefit from the
protection of international law, [through the tremendous growth of human
right protections since World War II] but they cannot be described as proper
subjects of international law'. 22 It is compatible with the principle of
sovereignty for states to agree that certain acts committed by their own
nationals constitute international crimes for which individuals can be
prosecuted. Even Schwarzenberger had to concede that:
`. . . it would be an unwarranted assumption to hold that only if the international
personality of the individual were recognized could the individual be treated as the
object of proceedings of an international criminal character'. 23
The principle of individual criminal responsibility was affirmed by the
following passage in the Nuremberg Judgement in what has come to be
referred to as the `Nuremberg revolution':
`Crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced.' 24
This principle was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly and
enshrined in the Nuremberg Principles25 and replicated in the International
Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind.26 It has been enshrined in the statutes and jurisprudence of both
ad hoc tribunals 27 and the ICC.28
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22 Dugard op cit (n13) 2.
23 Schwarzenberger op cit (n1) 275.
24 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1947) Vol I 223, as
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25 See Principle 1 of the Principles of International Law recognised in the Charter of the
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UN Doc A/1316 (1950) in C van den Wyngaert (ed) International Criminal Law ± A Collection
of International and European Instruments (1996) 501.
26 Article 3 of the draft Code. Report of the International Law Commission, 43rd session,
UNGAOR, 46th session, Supp No 10, A/46/10 (1991) in Van den Wyngaert op cit (n25) 505.
27 Articles 7(1) and 23(1) of the ICTY and aa 6(1) and 22(1) of the ICTR.
28 Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court A/CONF.183/9 (1998) ILM
999.
Rules Germane to International Law
Cassese, writing in 2003, describes `international criminal law [as] a branch of
public international law'29 whereas Schwarzenberger in 1950 submitted that
`international law [had] not yet evolved a branch of criminal law of its own'. 30
However, as Cassese cautions, it is a relatively new and very rudimentary
branch of law,31 the rules of which are to be found in the sources of public
international law as set out in a38(1) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, which are:
`. . . (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting Sttes;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; [and]
(c) the general principles 32 of law recognized by civilised nations'. 33
Although public international law is defined as that body of rules and
principles binding upon states in their relations with one another, 34 states
have limited their sovereignty by developing accountability for breaches of
international rules through gradual accretion. Initially, treaties ± and even
less so, international custom ± merely prohibited certain conduct without
necessarily providing for any criminal consequences if the prohibition was
breached.35 Since the 1940s, the international community considered certain
values, such as the protection of human life and dignity, important enough to
enshrine in various international instruments. 36 Treaties, particularly in the
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area of international human rights and humanitarian law, criminalized the
violation of conduct proscribed in order to protect these values. 37
Bassiouni, with his characteristic punctiliousness, analyses 274 conventions
concluded between 1815 and 199638 dealing with 25 categories of crimes39
which, he submits, contained one or more of ten possible penal
characteristics.40 Ironically, the term `international crime' has never specifi-
cally been used in treaties. Instead, provision was made for `a crime under
international law' or crime against the law of nations. However, regardless of
the exact phraseology, to address Schwarzenberger's objection that interna-
tional criminal law is not a branch of law on its own, one has to do more than
assess the provisions of international rules that prescribe municipal criminal
law.
As a branch of international law, it is important to contextualise his
objection in the conflicting philosophies that underlie international criminal
and public international law.41 International criminal law aims at punishing
transgressors whilst still safeguarding the rights of accused persons.
Therefore, its prohibitions must be as clear, detailed and specific as
possible, particularly in order not to violate the principle of legality.
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Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg legacy 2ed (2001) 12.
38 Bassiouni op cit (n33) 46-55.
39 1) Aggression; 2) genocide; 3) crimes against humanity; 4) war crimes; 5) crimes against
United Nations and associated personnel; 6) unlawful possession, use and emplacement of
weapons; 7) theft of nuclear materials; 8) mercenarism; 9) apartheid; 10) slavery and slave-
related practices; 11) torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment; 12) unlawful human experimentation; 13) piracy; 14) aircraft hijacking and
unlawful acts of international air safety; 15) unlawful acts against the safety of maritime
navigation and the safety of the platforms on the high seas; 16) threat and use of force against
internationally protected persons; 17) taking of civilian hostages; 18) unlawful use of mail; 19)
unlawful traffic in drugs and related drug offences; 20) destruction and/or theft of national
treasures; 21) unlawful acts against certain internationally protected elements of the
environment; 22) international traffic in obscene materials; 23) falsification and counter-
feiting; 24) unlawful interference with international submarine cables; and 25) bribery of
foreign public officials.
40 1) Explicit recognition of prescribed conduct as constituting an international crime or a crime
under international law or as a crime; 2) Implicit recognition of the penal nature of the act by
establishing a duty to prohibit, prevent, prosecute, punish or the like; 3) Criminalization of the
proscribed conduct; 4) Duty or right to prosecute; 5) Duty or right to punish the proscribed
conduct; 6) Duty or right to extradite; 7) Duty or right to co-operate in prosecution and
punishment (including judicial assistance in penal proceedings); 8) Establishment of a criminal
jurisdictional basis (or a theory of criminal jurisdiction or priority in criminal jurisdiction); 9)
Reference to the establishment of an international criminal court or an international tribunal
with penal characteristics; and 10) Elimination of the defence of superior orders.
41 See generally Cassese op cit (n4) 20-1 for a discussion on these conflicting philosophies.
Public international law, on the other hand, regulates the conflicting
interests of sovereign states with the aim of facilitating minimum peaceful
intercourse between states, rather than calling them to account for their
breaches of the law ± a `kind of ``private law'' between equal sovereign
States'. 42 The normative role of public international law is more important
than its repressive function. To ensure consensus between states on the
regulation of their conduct, law-making processes are based on the gradual
evolution of general, non-specific provisions ± often only loose rules, 43
which are ambiguous enough to reconcile any conflicting interests of states.
National legislatures are therefore, under an obligation to incorporate
treaties or international customary law that criminalize certain acts committed
by their subjects or within their territorial jurisdiction. 44 This has to be done
with the requisite specificity of content required of a criminal proscription 45
in a way that complies with the principle of legality. The principle of legality
requires that conduct be criminalized in a consistent and prospective manner,
which accordingly affords an accused the ability to regulate his or her
conduct to avoid the prescribed sanction being imposed. However, since
each state has its own unique judicial system, international rules are
criminalized in different ways. These differences have been accentuated
because the general 46 and procedural 47 parts of international criminal law
are undeveloped.
However, are all the 25 categories of crimes Bassiouni identifies
`international crimes'? Bassiouni states that only certain of these crimes are
truly international, while others are only transnational or partly international
or partly transnational. 48
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44 Schwarzenberger op cit (n1) 266; Cassese op cit (n4) 21.
45 Bassiouni op cit (n33) 5.
46 The general part of the substantive international criminal law refers to the `definition and
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(n4) 17.
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and Evidence. However, as Cassese claims `remains at a rather underdeveloped stage'. Op cit
(n4) 18.
48 Bassiouni op cit (n33) 97.
The Characteristics of International Crimes
At this stage of the development of international criminal law, Cassese
submits that
`. . .international crimes include war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
torture (as distinct from torture as one of the categories of war crimes or crimes
against humanity), aggression; and some extreme forms of terrorism (serious acts of
state-sponsored or -tolerated international terrorism). 49
Bassiouni regards international crimes as constituted by:
`[t]hose international criminal law normative proscriptions whose violation is likely
to affect the peace and security of humankind or is contrary to fundamental
humanitarian values, or which is the product of a state action or a state-favoring
policy'. 50
Bassiouni's list of international crimes includes all six referred to by
Cassese plus a further six. 51 What is common to both lists is that they
cumulatively embrace the following five characteristics. 52 First, the rules
protect values having the status of jus cogens. Their protection is therefore
considered important by the international community and consequently
binding on all states and individuals. Secondly, there is a universal interest in
repressing these crimes. Therefore, in principle, any state can prosecute and
punish these crimes, regardless of whether any territorial or nationality link
exists between the state and the perpetrator or the victim through the
exercise of universal jurisdiction. Thirdly, so as avoid violating the principle
of legality, all international crimes are violations of international customary
law. Fourthly, if the perpetrator has acted in an official capacity and is no
longer serving in that capacity, 53 the state on whose behalf he has performed
the crime is barred from claiming immunity in foreign criminal proceedings.
Each characteristic is discussed in turn.
Jus Cogens:
Initially a concept taken from the law of treaties, the existence of peremptory
norms was first expounded in a53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
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50 Bassiouni op cit (n33) 98-9.
51 Aggression; genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; crimes against the United Nations
and associated personnel; unlawful possession or use or emplacement of weapons; theft of
nuclear materials; mercenarism; apartheid; slavery and slave-related practices; torture and
other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and unlawful human
experimentation.
52 See Cassese op cit (n4) 23-5 and Bassiouni op cit (n33) 98.
53 If the category that the state official belongs to is that of head of state, foreign minister or
diplomatic agent. See Cassese op cit (n4) 24.
Treaties. Article 53 states that a treaty will be `void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law'.
The convention described `a peremptory norm of general international law
[as] a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted'. 54 Argued for
by socialist and developing countries in the late 1960s the concept of jus
cogens was not that certain rules could not be derogated from but that it was
because of the very nature of the rule that derogation was sought to be
prevented.55
It is arguable that these peremptory norms, or jus cogens, have
transformed international law from a system in which all rules carried equal
weight to `a system of ``graduated normativity'' in which certain peremptory
norms enjoy a higher status' 56 and are applicable to all states irrespective of
their specific treaty obligations. Traditionally, international law consisted of
norms, being equal in status, because of their formation by consensual and
equal states57 in a `morally pluralistic' system.58 There is still much scholarly
debate on what constitutes a peremptory norm and how a given norm rises
to that level. However, norms that protect human life and promote human
rights are universally recognised as having a special status. 59 The prohibition
on the use of force or aggression is clearly accepted and there is sufficient
legal basis60 to conclude that genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
apartheid, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices and torture are jus
cogens. 61
Obligations Erga Omnes
One of the consequences of a given international crime attaining jus cogens
status is that certain obligations `flowing to all' results. 62 Although dealing
with a civil matter, the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company Limited case in an obiter dictum held
that:
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54 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Brownlie op cit (n33) 388.
55 A Cassese International Law (2001) 140. The kind of norms they argued for were the
condemnation of `imperialism, slavery and forced labour and all practices that violated the
principle of equality of all human beings' see 139.
56 Dugard op cit (n13) 41 quoting P Weil `Towards relative normativity in international law?'
(1983) 77 AJIL 413. See also Bassiouni op cit (n33) 40.
57 Dugard op cit (n13) 40.
58 Du Plessis op cit (n42) 304.
59 Dugard op cit (n13) 40.
60 This basis is, inter alia, the large number of states that have ratified treaties relating to these
crimes and the international customary law status of the crimes.
61 Bassiouni op cit (n33) 41; Dugard op cit (n13) 41.
62 Bassiouni op cit (n33) 45.
`In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection, they are obligation erga omnes. Such obligations
derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts
of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination.' 63
Dugard argues that the Court recognised erga omnes obligations to avoid a
repeat of the South West Africa cases of 196664 in which Ethiopia and Liberia
were denied standing before the Court to challenge South Africa's
mismanagement of the territory of the then South West Africa. Their action
had been dismissed because they had no national interest in the dispute.
With the development of obligations erga omnes, it is no longer required that
a state prove a national interest if the obligation is of concern to the
international community. All states, therefore, have a legal interest in the
protection of the jus cogens norms.
In the field of international criminal law, obligations erga omnes `support
the right of all states to exercise universal jurisdiction over individual
offenders' 65 on the basis of the universality principle which will be discussed
later.
Dual Nature
The international crimes over which the ad hoc tribunals and ICC exercise
jurisdiction are crimes with a dual nature for which potentially both states
and individuals can be criminally responsible. Although the individual is
accountable in the current state of international criminal law, there is a
fundamental distinction between `individual' and `system' criminality. 66
Individual criminality concerning war crimes refers to those acts
`committed by combatants on their own initiative and for ``selfish'' reasons'.
System criminality refers to crimes committed on a large scale `at the request
or at least with the encouragement or toleration of the government
authorities'. 67 The commission of international crimes `presupposes the
complicity, participation, toleration or acquiescence of State authorities'. 68
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65 K C Randall `Universal jurisdiction under international law' (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785 at
830.
66 See Cassese op cit (n4) 295.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid
For this reason, Schwarzenberger criticised the Genocide Convention
saying that `[h]ardly any of these. . .crimes have been committed sponta-
neously by irresponsible individuals.' 69 Instead, for him, the Genocide
Convention was `based on the assumption of virtuous governments and
criminal individuals, a reversion of the truth in proportion to the degree of
totalitarianism and nationalism practised in any country'. 70 Schwarzenberger
concluded that `the Convention is unnecessary where it can be applied and
inapplicable where it may be necessary'. 71
Finally, almost 50 years later, the Genocide Convention became applicable
where it was necessary. Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first individual 72 tried for
genocide, not by a national court but by the ICTR. 73 Cassese argues that
because system criminality `involves an appraisal and condemnation of a
whole system of government,' it is more likely that international tribunals will
prosecute violations than states. States are unlikely to prosecute because of




`It is impossible to admit that individuals, by grouping themselves into States and
thus increasing immeasurably their potentialities for evil, can confer upon
themselves a degree of immunity from criminal liability and its consequences
which they do not enjoy when acting in isolation.' 75
However, state officials in the exercise of their functions, whether acting in a
de jure or de facto official capacity, could not be prosecuted because of the
immunities that accrue to them under international customary law. However,
as a further consequence of the recognition of jus cogens, `a State is never
entitled to immunity from any act that contravenes a jus cogens norm'. 76
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69 Schwarzenberger op cit (n1) 292.
70 Ibid.
71 Schwarzenberger op cit (n1) 293.
72 Jean-Paul Akayesu was the Bourgemester (Mayor) of the Taba Commune. A number of
higher-placed officials have been tried, for example the former Prime Minister, Jean
Kambanda. The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army, Augustin Bizimungu is currently in
detention. See ICTR Detainees ± Status on 1 September 2003 available at http://www.ictr.org.
73 The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998.
74 See Cassese op cit (n4) 298.
75 Schwarzenberger op cit (n1) 275.
76 Cassese op cit (n55) 145.
The statutes of the military, 77 of the ad hoc tribunals, 78 and the ICC79
removed these immunities so state officials could be held responsible for
international crimes. However, the bar on immunities is applicable only at
the level of international prosecutions. If the perpetrator is a serving head of
state, foreign minister or diplomatic agent, he or she will enjoy complete
personal immunity80 from prosecutions by foreign states. These immunities
are required for the effective performance of their functions 81 when
travelling abroad.
State Criminal Responsibility
After perusing various judgments and awards of the International Court of
Justice and other international tribunals, Schwarzenberger argued that none
have
`. . .openly avowed that a State has committed a crime under international
customary law as distinct from a breach of treaty or from the commission of an
international tort, or visited such an act with at least the sanction of frankly
admitted punitive damages'. 82
Recently, a number of cases have been brought by states before the
International Court of Justice alleging violations of international customary
law ± for example, genocide. However, the plaintiff states continue to request
relief in the language of ordinary state responsibility, ie the cessation of
hostilities and reparations rather than the imposition of penal sanctions. 83
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77 Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter: Charter of the International Military Tribunal adopted by
the Big Four Powers (1945) in Van den Wyngaert op cit (n25) 420. Article 6 of the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946) in G K McDonald and O Swaak-
Goldman (eds) Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The
Experience of International and National Courts (2002) Vol II 73.
78 Article 7(2) of the ICTY, a6(2) of the ICTR.
79 Article 27 of the Rome Statute op cit (n28).
80 Cassese op cit (n4) 271.
81 Ibid, quoting from Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (The Democratic
Republic of Congo v Belgium) 2001 ICJ Reports 1.
82 Schwarzenberger op cit (n1) 279.
83 See for example Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia and Montenegro); Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Uganda) and the cases brought by Serbia and Montenegro against
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and the United
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The International Law Commission, charged with the progressive
development and codification of international law, attempted to expand
state responsibility to the commission of international crimes. The Draft
Articles on State Responsibility 84 do not deal with the primary substantive
obligations of states, but with the responsibility of states for the violation of
treaty obligations or rules of international customary law. They set out the
secondary rules dealing with the consequences for a breach that
`encompasses a separate and relatively autonomous body of international
law, the law of State responsibility'. 85 Internationally wrongful acts, referred
to as international delicts, 86 were to be distinguished from international
crimes, formulated in a19 as follows:
`. . .
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an
international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests
of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that
community as a whole, constitutes an international crime.
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of international law in
force, an international crime may result, inter alia, from:
(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
maintenance of international peace and security, such as prohibiting
aggression;
(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as
prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial
domination;
(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of
essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those
prohibiting slavery, genocide, apartheid;
(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as
those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.' 87
Here again one sees the nomenclature of the concept of jus cogens,
especially in para 2. In the International Law Commission's 2001 report, a19
in the form quoted above and the distinction between delicts and crimes no
406 SACJ . (2003) 16
84 The Draft Articles of State Responsibility were adopted at their first reading in 1996. See
Dugard op cit (n13) 205.
85 Cassese op cit (n55) 185.
86 Article 19(4) of the Draft Articles op cit (n84).
87 International Law Commission's 1996 Report, GAOR 51st session, Supp 10 at 125 quoted in D
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longer appear. According to Cassese, the concept of international crimes
entailing state responsibility was abandoned `because of the reluctance of
States to accept the notion that they may be accused of ``crimes'' . . .[and] the
difficulty for the international criminal law in pinpointing the consequences
of these ``crimes'' '. 88 The authors of the 2003 Commentary on the Draft
Articles recognise that there has been `no development of penal
consequences for States of breaches of these fundamental norms'. 89 They
quote a statement by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY:
`[U]nder present international law it is clear that States, by definition, cannot be the
subject of criminal sanctions akin to those provided for in national criminal
systems'. 90
Therefore, Schwarzenberger's observation that states cannot be criminally
liable91 is still pertinent today.
International Criminal Courts
Schwarzenberger, writing in another historical context, only considered the
evidence of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo as
enforcing international criminal law at an international level. 92 Both imposed
criminal liability on individuals for crimes against the peace, war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed during the World War II. Schwarzen-
berger conceded that `[i]n form, the law applied by the tribunals was
international law'. 93 However, for him the tribunals were `in substance more
akin to municipal war crime courts than to truly international tribunals' 94
because `the signatories to the Charter . . . only did jointly what each of them,
if in sole control of Germany, could have done'. 95 As co-sovereigns of
Germany, the Allies `were free to agree on any additional legal principles
which they cared to apply'.
The idea of a permanent international criminal court, however, was not a
new one. After World War II, the newly constituted United Nations adopted a
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Emperor to trial before an international tribunal. See Dugard op cit (n13) 151.
93 Schwarzenberger op cit (n1) 290.
94 Op cit (n1) 291.
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resolution mandating the International Law Commission to begin work on a
draft statute for such a court. 96 It was recognised that `in the course of the
development of the international community, there will be an increasing
need [for] an international judicial organ for the trial of certain crimes under
international law'. 97 However, only after the end of the Cold War and the
explosion that occurred in its aftermath98 in the form of `nationalism,
religious fundamentalism, and ethnic and religious hatred [that] spawned
violence, ethnic cleansing [and] bloodshed,' 99 was attention again given to
the need of a permanent international criminal court.
At the time the International Law Commission was preparing a draft
statute, events compelled the Security Council, acting in terms of Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter, to assess the situation in the former Yugoslavia
as a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council created
an ad hoc court to respond to the atrocities, mandating the ICTY to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. 100
In November 1994, and acting on a request from Rwanda, the Security
Council voted to create a second ad hoc tribunal, charged with the
prosecution of genocide and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries
during the year 1994. 101
The creation of the ad hoc tribunals `fuelled the widespread belief that a
permanent international criminal court was desirable and practical'. 102 Its
creation was finally accomplished on 1 July 2002 when the Statute of the
International Criminal Court 103 came into force after receiving the requisite
60 ratifications. 104
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103 The International Criminal Court Statute was adopted on 19 July 1998 at Rome by a non-
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was non-recorded at the United State's suggestion, the United States, China, Israel and India
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104 For signature and ratification status, see http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html.
Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Courts
With regard to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, Schwarzenberger
submitted that
`[i]n form, the law applied by the tribunal was international law: international
customary law, in so far as jurisdiction regarding war crimes . . . and newly
established treaty law regarding crimes against peace and humanity.' 105
However, he quoted a British Aide-MeÂmoire of 1945 that revealed their
doubts as to whether crimes against the peace could `properly be described
as crimes under international law'. 106 Schwarzenberger quoted the Allies as
saying that they `declare what the international law is so that there won't be
any discussion on whether it is international law or not'. 107
In the early 1990s, when Trinidad and Tobago revived the initiative to
establish an international criminal court, it did so with the aim that the court
would deal with drug-trafficking. 108 The Preparatory Commission (PrepCom)
debated the prospect of the court's jurisdiction over drug-trafficking
as an international crime. Although regulated by international treaty in what
might be termed as a `suppression convention', 109 drug-trafficking was
eventually excluded from the jurisdiction of the court. The reasons were
twofold.
First, they did not explicitly `create or define crimes under international
law, but envisage[d] that national legislation [would] be enacted to make
specific conduct criminal under the relevant national law'. 110 Therefore,
drug-trafficking is not an international customary law crime and the PrepCom
agreed that the prosecution of such crimes was better left to states using the
modalities of international co-operation to enforce it. Secondly, `normally it is
[committed by] private individuals or criminal organisations . . . against
States'. 111
The ICTY and ICTR, sharing virtually identical statutes, exercise jurisdiction
over genocide,112 grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 113 and
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violations of the laws and customs of war114 and crimes against humanity. 115
Similarly, the ICC only has jurisdiction over four crimes, viz genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and aggression. 116
International Enforcement
To assert with confidence that international criminal law exists because the
international community has finally established an international criminal
court is, unfortunately, only half the story. The enforcement of international
criminal law remains rooted in the co-operation of states with international
courts. No direct enforcement mechanism yet exists that allows `a given body
to enforce its orders without going through the authority of states to carry out
enforcement functions'. 117 Bassiouni refers to the direct and indirect
enforcement models. 118 In the direct or vertical model, an internationally
created organ directly punishes individuals for crimes against the interna-
tional order as opposed to the national order.
The ICTY, ICTR and ICC `are only in part a ``direct enforcement
system.'' ' 119 They cannot directly prosecute, adjudicate and enunciate
penalties without going through the instrumentality of state authorities. 120
The international courts require states for almost all aspects of enforcement
of their legal orders and sanctions. The ad hoc tribunals do not represent a
voluntary concession by states of their sovereignty, as is the case with the
ICC, as they were both established by the compulsory powers of the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII. Court orders are therefore binding on all
states although little can be done if a state refuses to comply. 121
Bassiouni describes the ICC as a hybrid system.122 Not only does it depend
on states for the same six modalities 123 as required for international co-
operation to combat crime but its entire operation is premised on the
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doctrine of complementarity. Paragraph 10 of the Preamble to the Rome
Statute says that the court's jurisdiction will be complementary to that of the
national criminal jurisdiction. Article 17 of the Statute embodies the
complementarity principle and provides that a case is inadmissible before
the court if:
`(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the
State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.'
Therefore, the ICC will only be able to exercise jurisdiction where a national
judicial system is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate. Article 17
creates a complex relationship between national legal systems and the court,
with the latter declining to exercise jurisdiction when a case is being
appropriately handled by a national judicial system. Moreover, the fact that a
major power like the United States is not a state party to the Rome Statute
raises questions as to the ultimate effectiveness of the court. 124
Enforcement by States
With the international community unable to proscribe conduct with the
`characteristics of enacted positive criminal law' 125 international law has only
prescribed126 or authorized127 municipal criminal law. Therefore, Schwar-
zenberger concluded that offences by individuals `against the ``law of
nations'' are not crimes under international law, but offences against rules of
internationally postulated municipal criminal law'. 128
There are two issues. First, did the state actually prescribe such conduct by
ratifying the relevant treaty; and secondly, how have states exercised their
jurisdiction over the commission of such crimes?
First, with regard to ratification as Schwarzenberger pointed out, the failure
of a state to incorporate a treaty obligation to prohibit certain conduct into its
national criminal law is merely a breach of its international obligation and not
an international crime.129 Furthermore, as observed by Cassese, `[s]tates have
found many means of evading international obligations'. 130 For this reason, a
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characteristic of international crimes is that they are part of international
customary law so that a state cannot claim that it does not have national law
that proscribes certain conduct.
Secondly, with regard to enforcement, although Schwarzenberger did not
mention any particular crime, he asserted that states in general are able to
extend the reach of their criminal laws beyond their territorial boundaries
because of their sovereignty and independence. 131 Generally with regard to
the exercise of jurisdiction, 132 because of the principle of sovereignty, states
have traditionally exercised their criminal jurisdiction on the principle of
territoriality or, if it the perpetrator was a national, the active nationality
principle. Gradually, states also began to exercise their jurisdiction if the
victims were nationals in terms of the passive personality principle or if its
own interests were at stake on the protective principle.
The aut dedere aut judicare, the prosecute or extradite, principle
contained in many conventions133 has extended the universal jurisdictional
principle, which first allowed for the international authorisation of
prosecutions against piracy. 134 Conditional universal jurisdiction, as the aut
dedere aut judicare principle implies, requires the presence of the accused in
the territory of the state for it to exercise jurisdiction or it must hand the
accused over to a concerned state. Absolute universal jurisdiction, on the
other hand, does not require any connection between the prosecuting state
and the perpetrator. The exercise of absolute jurisdiction is a contentious
issue135 and only applies to international crimes that embrace all the
characteristics previously discussed. Certain states, most notably Spain,
Belgium and to some extent Germany have `been prepared to substitute
themselves for national and territorial courts, whenever the latter courts fail
to take proceedings against persons suspected or accused of serious
international crimes'. 136 More states have been prepared to do so since the
ICTY and ICTR were established137 yet many individuals continue to escape
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liability because their national state is unlikely to charge them with crimes
committed with its collusion.138
`Horizontal international criminal law' refers to the international co-
operation between states in the enforcement of municipal criminal law and is
not concerned with the substance of criminal law. It addresses `the common
interest of States in the punishment of offences which threaten the wellbeing
of society and . . . the interest of the State into whose territory the criminal
[has] come [so] that he should not remain at large therein'. 139 Due to the
`territorial limitation of national sovereignty' 140 the need for treaties on
extradition, mutual assistance and other modalities of co-operation between
states arises to facilitate the administration of municipal criminal justice.
Despite the liberal and permissive regime of extraterritorial municipal
criminal jurisdiction as set out in the Lotus case, which allows states to extend
their jurisdiction as they wish unless there is a principle of international law
which prohibits such extension, with regard to enforcement, there is one
definitive prohibitive rule:
`. . .the actual exercise of criminal jurisdiction in concrete instances must take place
within a State's own territory or in places assimilated to it.' 141
Conclusion
As Dugard states:
`Punishment of individuals for international crimes is a sanction of international law
in the best tradition of the municipal criminal offence and provides evidence to
even the most ill-informed observer that international law is sometimes enforced by
punishment. International law is not, therefore, without sanctions. On the other
hand it must be conceded that sanctions of this kind lack the comprehensiveness,
regularity, and consistency associated with sanctions in domestic law.' 142
Since the establishment of international fora to prosecute international
crimes, `international criminal law' as a technical term is coming into its own
for the first time. States have established a new branch of international law by
treaty with its own principles and standards, and as the jurisprudence of the
ad hoc tribunals shows, it is beginning to develop areas previously neglected
such as general principles and sentencing by applying the `overlapping and
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concurrent sources of law . . . emanating from the international legal system
and from national legal systems'. 143
However, Schwarzenberger's central objection that international criminal
law cannot be applied universally because of the lack of central institutions,
has not been solved by the establishment of the ICC, dependent and
secondary as it is to states, with some like the United States remaining
immune from its jurisdiction. However, `the fact that delegates at Rome were
able to come together and finalise the Rome Statute suggests the existence of
a social system built on universal respect for the idea of human rights'. 144
Although more evidence exists of states pursuing accountability through their
municipal criminal justice systems on the basis of universal jurisdiction,
`national courts are still loath to bring to justice persons accused of
international crimes [because they are] still dominated by nationalistic, short-
term interests'. 145
At present, the sword wielded by the international community is still made
of paper, ineffective to hold all states accountable for the violation of
international rules. Schwarzenberger's article will remain prescribed reading
for awhile yet.
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